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REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PARLIAMENTARY WORK: UZBEKISTAN'S 2026 LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Fozil M. Nazarov
Independent Researcher,
Tashkent State University of Law, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
E-mail: fozilnazarov28@gmail.com | ORCID: [0009-0005-8054-8993]

Abstract

Parliaments are adopting artificial intelligence (AI) later than executive bodies, but the legal questions they face are sharper. When a ministry automates a service, the citizen is a client; when a parliament automates part of lawmaking or oversight, the citizen is the source of the power being exercised. This article examines how Uzbekistan approached this problem in 2026. Two instruments are analysed: Resolution No. 1941-V of the Council of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis of 13 April 2026, which approved a 2026–2029 work plan for introducing AI into the work of the chamber, and Law No. O'RQ-1115 of 21 January 2026, which inserted into the Law "On Informatization" a statutory definition of AI and a new Article 7^1 prohibiting decisions affecting human rights from being based solely on AI outputs. Using the concept of "algorithmic delegation" – the transfer of procedural stages of parliamentary functions to algorithms – the article shows that the work plan is almost entirely technological and that three normative questions remain open: the legal status of AI outputs in parliamentary procedure, guarantees of algorithmic political neutrality, and the sovereignty of parliamentary data. The Uzbek framework is compared with the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Guidelines for AI in parliaments, and the practice of the parliaments of Estonia and Brazil. The article concludes with concrete statutory proposals, including an advisory AI impact analysis of draft laws, intelligent monitoring in parliamentary oversight subject

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to annual algorithmic audit, and legal guarantees of the independence of parliamentary digital infrastructure.

Keywords: Artificial intelligence; parliament; legislative process; parliamentary oversight; human oversight; algorithmic delegation; separation of powers; Uzbekistan; EU AI Act.

1. Introduction

Digital government has developed unevenly across the branches of state power. Executive bodies, which deliver services to millions of users, were the first to invest in digital platforms, data infrastructure and, more recently, AI. Legislatures followed more slowly. The reasons are partly institutional – parliaments are smaller organisations with limited technical staff – and partly constitutional: a parliament is a deliberative and representative body, and any tool that intervenes in deliberation or representation raises questions of legitimacy that do not arise when a tax office automates a form.

Since the release of large language models in 2022-2023 this gap has begun to narrow. Parliaments now use AI for transcription, translation, document classification, comparison of bill texts, analysis of public comments and support for oversight. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) responded in December 2024 with Guidelines for AI in parliaments, whose central principle is that AI should augment rather than replace human capability, especially in democratic deliberation and decision-making (IPU, 2024a). At the same time, general AI legislation has appeared: the European Union adopted the Artificial Intelligence Act in 2024, and the Council of Europe opened for signature the first international treaty on AI and human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

Uzbekistan offers an instructive case. In January 2026 it adopted Law No. O‘RQ-1115, which for the first time defined AI in national legislation and established a basic human-rights safeguard for AI-based information systems. In April 2026 the Council of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis adopted Resolution No. 1941-V, approving a 35-item work plan for introducing AI into parliamentary work in 2026–2029. Taken together, these documents represent

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an ambitious attempt by a post-Soviet presidential republic to bring AI into the heart of its legislature.

This article asks whether the legal framework keeps pace with the technology. It argues that Uzbekistan has created a strong technological and organisational basis, and a first statutory safeguard, but that the constitutional and procedural questions specific to parliaments – the status of AI outputs in parliamentary procedure, the political neutrality of algorithms and the independence of parliamentary data from the executive – remain unregulated. The analysis draws on the author's doctoral research on the organisational and legal support for the digitalisation of representative bodies. Methodologically, the article combines doctrinal analysis of Uzbek legislation, interpretation of constitutional norms by grammatical, systemic, historical and teleological methods (Larenz, 1991; Barak, 2005), and comparative analysis of European and international standards and of the practice of selected parliaments.

The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework and introduces the concept of algorithmic delegation. Section 3 analyses the 2026 Uzbek instruments. Section 4 compares them with European and international standards and parliamentary practice. Section 5 formulates legislative proposals, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Why parliaments are different: representation, accountability and algorithmic delegation

2.1. The digital state and the digital representative body

Much of the literature on algorithmic governance concerns administrative decision-making: benefits, licences, policing and taxation (Citron, 2008; Coglianese & Lehr, 2017; Yeung, 2018). Its central concerns – due process, explainability and the risk of "algocracy", in which algorithms structure the choices available to humans (Danaher, 2016) – apply to parliaments as well. However, the parliamentary context differs from the administrative one in at least five respects, which together justify a separate legal regime.

First, purpose. The digital state automates administrative processes in order to deliver services efficiently; a representative body exists to express the will of the people (Pitkin, 1967). Efficiency is a secondary value in a legislature, where

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slowness may reflect deliberation rather than waste. Second, the status of the citizen. On a public services portal the citizen is a client; in relation to parliament the citizen is the bearer of sovereignty. Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan declares the people to be the sole source of state power. Third, accountability. An official is accountable administratively within a hierarchy; a deputy is accountable politically to the electors (Manin, Przeworski & Stokes, 1999). An algorithm that shapes a deputy's decision without the electors' knowledge blurs this line of accountability. Fourth, institutional independence. Under the separation of powers (Article 11 of the Constitution), parliament scrutinises the executive. If parliament depends on infrastructure, data and software administered by the executive, its oversight risks becoming symbolic. Fifth, transparency. For a service provider transparency is a quality standard; for a legislature it is a constitutional obligation, reinforced in Uzbekistan by the guarantees of freedom of information and openness of state bodies in Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution.

For these reasons the author has proposed elsewhere to distinguish a "digital representative body" from the general concept of the digital state. A digital representative body is a body of state power that, on the basis of a democratic mandate, exercises its legislative, oversight and representative functions through digital means, guarantees citizens' constitutional rights, is institutionally and technologically independent of the executive and has dedicated normative support. The last two elements are decisive for AI: an AI system used by a parliament must be governed by rules that preserve both the deputy's responsibility and parliament's independence.

2.2. Algorithmic delegation

Parliaments have always delegated. They delegate implementation to the government, technical drafting to legal services and fact-finding to committees and auditors. AI introduces a qualitatively different form of delegation. The term algorithmic delegation is used here to denote the transfer of particular procedural stages of parliamentary functions – collecting information, analysing it, detecting anomalies, classifying appeals, comparing texts or forecasting effects – to algorithms. Unlike traditional delegation, the entity that produces the

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analysis is not a person who can be summoned, questioned or held accountable, but a mathematical model whose reasoning may be opaque even to its operators (Pasquale, 2015).

Algorithmic delegation is not illegitimate in itself. A speech-recognition system that drafts a verbatim record for human editors raises few constitutional issues. The problem arises when an algorithm's output begins to function as a decision or as a decisive input: when a system ranks citizens' appeals and thereby determines which are read, when a sentiment-analysis tool tells a committee how "the public" views a bill, or when a budget-monitoring system determines which ministries deserve scrutiny. In each case three normative questions arise: (1) what legal force the output has within parliamentary procedure; (2) how its political neutrality is guaranteed; and (3) where the underlying data are stored and who controls them. These questions structure the analysis of the Uzbek framework below.

3. Uzbekistan's 2026 framework

3.1. Background

Uzbekistan's digital policy is defined by the "Digital Uzbekistan – 2030" Strategy, approved by Presidential Decree No. PF-6079 of 5 October 2020, and has been complemented by specific acts on AI, including Presidential Decree No. PF-189 of 22 October 2025 on additional measures for the further development of AI technologies. Parliamentary digitalisation proceeded in parallel. Resolution No. 3861-IV of the Council of the Legislative Chamber of 26 December 2023 approved an updated plan of measures for the digitalisation of parliamentary activity; under it, electronic document management through the edo.ijro.uz module was fully introduced from 1 February 2024, and the consideration of draft laws through the project.gov.uz portal was established.

Nevertheless, empirical indicators show that the legislature remains at an early stage of digital maturity. The website of the Legislative Chamber, parliament.gov.uz, ranks 690th and that of the Senate, senat.uz, 945th in the national domain ranking. In 2025 only 40 percent of the 7,149 appeals received by deputies of the Legislative Chamber were submitted electronically, while the digital channels of the executive received 1,606 times more appeals. This

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asymmetry – which the author terms the vertical digital divide between parliament and the executive – is the background against which the 2026 AI instruments must be assessed.

3.2. Resolution No. 1941-V: an ambitious technological agenda

Resolution No. 1941-V of 13 April 2026 approved a work plan of 35 items for introducing AI technologies into the work of the Legislative Chamber in 2026-2029 (Council of the Legislative Chamber, 2026). Most items transfer parts of the chamber's four main functions – lawmaking, oversight, representation and public information – to AI systems.

Based on Resolution No. 1941-V and its annexed 2026–2029 work plan, the main artificial intelligence (AI) measures are outlined across five key areas:

Institutional Basis: Establishes the Project Office for the Development of AI Technologies under the Institute of Parliamentary Studies, hosts parliamentary AI systems on an isolated internal network, develops a national legal language model in Uzbek, and implements AI literacy assessments along with an AI Readiness Certificate for deputies and staff.

Lawmaking. Analysis of texts and effects. Introduces an AI-linguist system for automatic detection of inconsistencies in draft laws, an anti-corruption AI filter, and regulatory impact forecasting tools.

Oversight. Detection of anomalies; measurement of opinion. Deploys an intelligent dashboard to track ministerial budget indicators in real time, a "Budget AI-monitoring" system, and social media/mass media sentiment analysis to monitor the implementation of laws.

Representation. Classification and prioritization. Implements intelligent categorization of citizens' appeals with automatic routing to deputies, alongside a virtual consultant service.

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Information. Drafting support. Integrates speech-to-text conversion tools and an AI assistant specifically for deputies.

Three features of the plan deserve emphasis. First, it is comprehensive: it covers every core function of the chamber rather than isolated services. Second, it pays attention to institutional capacity and security. Paragraph 1 creates a dedicated organisational unit; paragraph 8 addresses data security and sovereignty by requiring an isolated internal network and a national legal language model; and paragraph 11 addresses human capability through literacy assessment and certification. These three measures reflect proposals developed in the author's research and have been confirmed as implemented by the Institute of Parliamentary Studies.

Third, and critically, the plan is a technological programme rather than a legal one. None of its 35 items provides for amending a law, introducing a new norm or establishing a procedural rule. The plan states what systems will be built but not what legal effect their outputs will have, who answers for their errors, or how their neutrality will be verified. A resolution of the Council of the chamber is, moreover, an internal organisational act: it cannot by itself create obligations for ministries, guarantee the rights of citizens whose appeals are classified by algorithms, or bind the Senate and local Kengashes.

3.3. Law No. O'RQ-1115: the first statutory safeguard

Law No. O'RQ-1115 of 21 January 2026 amended several legislative acts in connection with the regulation of relations arising from the use of AI. Article 1 amended the Law "On Informatization" of 11 December 2003 by inserting into Article 3 a definition of AI as technological solutions that imitate human knowledge and skills, enabling independent learning and the search for solutions and producing results comparable to human intellectual activity. It also inserted a new Article 7^1 on the use of AI in information systems. Under this article, information systems created with the use of AI must not harm the life, health, dignity or fundamental rights of individuals, and decisions affecting human rights may not be based solely on conclusions generated by AI (Law No. O'RQ-1115, 2026). Article 2 of the Law amended the Code of Administrative Liability

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to establish liability for the unlawful processing of personal data with the use of AI and for its dissemination.

Article 7^1 is an important step. It introduces into Uzbek law a principle comparable to Article 22 of the EU General Data Protection Regulation, which gives individuals the right not to be subject to decisions based solely on automated processing that produce legal effects concerning them (Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi, 2017). For parliaments, the article establishes an outer limit: an AI system may assist, but it cannot replace, the human decision-maker where human rights are affected.

The provision, however, is general. It applies to all information systems and is formulated in terms of individual rights. Parliamentary acts – laws, resolutions, decisions to initiate an inquiry – affect human rights indirectly and collectively, and it is uncertain whether Article 7^1 applies to them at all. The article also says nothing about the specific risks of parliamentary use: the political neutrality of algorithms, the publicity of AI-generated analyses used in lawmaking, or the control of parliamentary data.

3.4. Three open normative questions

Applying the framework of algorithmic delegation to the Uzbek instruments reveals three gaps.

The legal status of AI outputs. The work plan provides for AI analyses of draft laws and for AI-based detection of budget anomalies, but no norm states what such outputs are in procedural terms. Can an anomaly detected by the "Budget AI-monitoring" system serve as the formal ground for a deputy inquiry or a parliamentary investigation? Must a committee respond to a negative AI impact forecast? Without answers, AI outputs risk exercising influence without responsibility: decisive in practice but invisible in law.

Algorithmic political neutrality. Sentiment analysis of social media and the classification of appeals are not politically neutral operations. The choice of training data, categories and thresholds determines whose voices are counted and how. In a parliament, where different political parties and factions compete, an algorithm biased toward particular groups would distort representation itself.

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No norm currently guarantees neutrality or provides for independent verification.

The sovereignty of parliamentary data. Paragraph 8 of Resolution No. 1941-V provides for an isolated internal network, which is a significant safeguard. Yet it is an internal organisational measure. At the level of law, nothing prevents parliamentary information systems from being hosted, administered or audited by bodies of the executive – the very branch that parliament oversees. In addition, it remains unclear whether AI-generated oversight reports are to be published or used only internally, which affects the transparency of oversight required by Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution.

4. Comparative perspective

4.1. The EU Artificial Intelligence Act

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) establishes a risk-based regime for AI systems placed on the market or used in the Union. Several of its mechanisms are directly relevant to parliaments, even though the Act does not regulate legislatures as such. Article 4 obliges providers and deployers to ensure a sufficient level of AI literacy among their staff – a requirement that has applied since 2 February 2025 and that closely parallels the AI literacy assessment and certification provided for in paragraph 11 of Resolution No. 1941-V. Article 14 requires that high-risk AI systems be designed so that they can be effectively overseen by natural persons, including the ability to disregard, override or reverse the output. Article 27 requires deployers that are bodies governed by public law to carry out a fundamental rights impact assessment before using certain high-risk systems. Annex III, point 8(b), classifies as high-risk AI systems intended to influence the outcome of elections or referendums or the voting behaviour of natural persons (Veale & Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2021).

Two lessons follow for Uzbekistan. First, human oversight is not merely a prohibition of "solely automated" decisions, as in Article 7[1], but a set of positive design and organisational obligations: competent persons, the technical ability to override, and documentation. Second, the democratic process is treated as an area of elevated risk. Tools that analyse public opinion or classify political

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communication in a parliament fall close to this category and therefore warrant stricter safeguards than ordinary administrative tools.

4.2. The Council of Europe Framework Convention

The Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225), opened for signature on 5 September 2024, is the first binding international treaty on AI. Unlike the AI Act, it is formulated around the protection of democracy as such. Article 5 requires parties to adopt measures to ensure that AI systems are not used to undermine the integrity, independence and effectiveness of democratic institutions and processes, including the principle of the separation of powers (Council of Europe, 2024). The Convention also contains obligations on transparency and oversight and on risk and impact management.

Although Uzbekistan is not a member of the Council of Europe, the Convention is open to non-member states and offers a useful normative reference. Its explicit link between AI and the separation of powers supports the argument advanced in this article: the independence of parliament's digital infrastructure from the executive is not a technical preference but a requirement of constitutional design.

4.3. The IPU Guidelines for AI in parliaments

The IPU Guidelines, developed with the Parliamentary Data Science Hub of the IPU Centre for Innovation in Parliament and published in December 2024, are addressed specifically to legislatures (IPU, 2024a). They cover strategy, governance, ethics and risk management, and they follow the IPU Assembly resolution of October 2024 on the impact of AI on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Guidelines are soft law, but they reflect a professional consensus among parliamentary administrations: AI should augment human capability, especially in deliberation and decision-making; its use should be governed by an explicit institutional policy; and risks should be identified and managed before deployment. The IPU has also published a catalogue of use cases from member parliaments (IPU, 2024b).

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4.4. Parliamentary practice: Estonia and Brazil

Two parliaments illustrate how safeguards operate in practice. The Riigikogu of Estonia uses HANS, an AI-powered system that records plenary speeches, converts them to text, identifies speakers and integrates agenda items and voting information. Audio is processed in short segments, and the AI-generated drafts are reviewed by human editors before the verbatim record is published; the target speech-to-text error rate is below 10 percent (IPU, 2024c). The design keeps the human editor responsible for the official record.

The Chamber of Deputies of Brazil developed the Ulysses programme from 2018. It supports a broad range of tasks: routing drafting requests to specialists, identifying similar existing bills, analysing amendments, transcribing debates, organising public comments by argument and authenticating remote votes. Human review is built into each stage – specialists check routing suggestions, editors refine transcripts and proposals require human approval – and in December 2025 the Chamber formalised internal data governance and ethical AI policies (Apolitical, n.d.). Notably, Brazil adopted these rules at the level of internal parliamentary regulation, without waiting for national AI legislation.

South Korea's National Assembly provides a further example of AI-supported legislative information services and analytical support for oversight through its legislative information system. The common thread is that technological ambition is matched by explicit rules on human review and institutional control.

4.5. Comparative assessment

Table 1 compares the safeguards of the Uzbek framework with the instruments discussed above.

Table 1. Safeguards for AI use: Uzbekistan compared with European and international instruments

Safeguard	EU AI Act	CoE Convention / IPU Guidelines	Uzbekistan (2026)
Human oversight	Positive obligations for high-risk systems (Art. 14)	Oversight obligations; AI should augment, not replace, human decision-making	Prohibition of decisions affecting human rights based solely on AI (Law "On Informatization", Art. 7[1])

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Safeguard	EU AI Act	CoE Convention / IPU Guidelines	Uzbekistan (2026)
AI literacy	Obligation of providers and deployers (Art. 4)	Capacity-building recommended	AI literacy assessment and certificate (Res. 1941-V, para. 11)
Protection of democratic processes	AI influencing elections and voting classified as high-risk (Annex III, 8(b))	Integrity of democratic institutions and separation of powers (CoE, Art. 5)	Not addressed
Impact assessment and audit	Fundamental rights impact assessment for public bodies (Art. 27)	Risk and impact management; governance policy	Not established
Data control and independence	Governed mainly by data protection law	Separation of powers; institutional governance	Isolated internal network (Res. 1941-V, para. 8), not enshrined in law
Transparency of AI use	Transparency and information duties	Transparency and documentation	Not established

Source: compiled by the author.

The comparison shows that Uzbekistan has matched international practice on human-centred limits and AI literacy, and has taken a first organisational step on data security. The gaps concern exactly the three questions identified in Section 3.4: the procedural status of AI outputs, the protection of democratic processes from algorithmic bias, and the legal independence and transparency of parliamentary AI systems.

5. Legislative proposals

The proposals below follow four principles. Constitutional neutrality: they can be implemented at the level of ordinary and constitutional laws without amending the Constitution. Organic integration: new norms are placed in existing acts rather than in a separate code. Practical measurability: each norm contains verifiable deadlines or procedures. Comparative prudence: foreign solutions are adapted to the national system rather than copied.

5.1. An advisory AI impact analysis of draft laws

It is proposed to supplement the first part of Article 126 of the Law "On the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis" with a new

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paragraph 12 – a preliminary expert opinion of an automated system on the impact of a draft law on the dynamics of social relations – and to insert a new Article 133[1] establishing the procedure for such analysis. Under the proposed article, when a draft law is prepared for first reading, an intelligent socio-legal analysis is carried out using AI systems within the digital infrastructure of the Oliy Majlis, based on open data, social media, mass media and the database of citizens' appeals. The responsible committee attaches the resulting conclusion and forecast indicators to its decision and to the explanatory note, and, when preparing the second reading, considers measures to address the risks and public objections identified.

The key safeguard is the legal characterisation of the output: the AI conclusion is auxiliary information for the committee, not a binding instruction. The technical operation of the system is entrusted to a specialised unit of the chamber's office, as in the case of legal and budgetary expertise, while the political assessment remains with the deputies. This answers the first open question by giving AI outputs a defined, limited and public place in procedure.

5.2. Intelligent monitoring in parliamentary oversight, subject to annual audit

It is proposed to supplement Article 5 of the Law "On Parliamentary Oversight" with a new form of oversight – the use of intelligent monitoring and information-analytical systems – and to insert a new Article 11[1]. Under this article, the chambers of the Oliy Majlis, their committees and commissions use automated intelligent monitoring systems in examining the implementation of the state budget, the application of legislation and public opinion in socio-economic areas. Information on systemic inconsistencies and risks detected in the use of public funds, public procurement and the implementation of normative acts is sent to the responsible committees, which consider it within fifteen days and may initiate the oversight measures provided for by law. To ensure the neutrality of the algorithms and prevent algorithmic bias, the software is subject to a mandatory annual algorithmic audit. It is also proposed to amend Article 21 so that recommendations adopted on the results of oversight may address shortcomings identified in the algorithmic systems of state bodies.

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This proposal gives AI-detected anomalies a clear procedural route – consideration by a committee within a fixed period – while preserving the deputies' discretion over whether to act. The annual algorithmic audit addresses the second open question, and it has a natural parallel in the risk-management and impact-assessment obligations of the European and international instruments.

5.3. Legal guarantees of the independence of parliamentary digital infrastructure

To address the third question, it is proposed to enshrine in the constitutional laws on the Legislative Chamber and the Senate the independence of parliament's information and communication infrastructure from the executive, subordinating it to the offices of the chambers. The Law "On Cybersecurity" should be supplemented with a requirement to protect parliamentary information systems at the level of facilities containing state secrets and to conduct an independent annual cyber-audit. At the institutional level, a protected "Parliamentary Cloud" platform, isolated from executive networks, should be created for the Oliy Majlis and local representative bodies. These measures would raise the isolated network envisaged by paragraph 8 of Resolution No. 1941-V from an internal arrangement to a statutory guarantee of the separation of powers.

5.4. Transparency of parliamentary AI use

Finally, the chambers should publish a register of the AI systems they use, indicating each system's purpose, the function it supports, the unit responsible and the date of its last audit. AI-generated analyses attached to draft laws under the proposed Article 133[1] should be published together with the explanatory note. Such openness costs little, follows directly from Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution and allows citizens and researchers to verify that AI supports, rather than substitutes for, parliamentary deliberation.

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The proposed regulatory solutions are summarized as follows:

Undefined status of AI outputs in lawmaking. Amendments to Article 126, paragraph 12, and the addition of a new Article 133[1] to the Law on the Rules of Procedure of the Legislative Chamber will establish that advisory AI impact analyses must be attached to committee decisions and explanatory notes, with deputies retaining final decision-making authority.

Undefined route for AI-detected anomalies and risk of bias: Amendments to Articles 5 and 21, plus a new Article 11[1] of the Law "On Parliamentary Oversight", will formalize intelligent monitoring as a recognized form of oversight, mandate committee reviews of detected issues within 15 days, and require an annual algorithmic audit.

Dependence of parliamentary data on the executive branch. Amendments to the Constitutional Laws on the Chambers and the Law "On Cybersecurity" will guarantee the independence of parliamentary ICT infrastructure, establish state-secret level data protection, and require annual independent cyber-audits.

Opacity of AI use. Revisions to the Rules of Procedure and the Law "On the Openness of the Activity of State Authority and Administration Bodies" will mandate a public register of parliamentary AI systems and require the publication of AI-generated analyses alongside draft laws.

6. Conclusion

Uzbekistan's 2026 reforms show that a legislature can move quickly from basic digitalisation to an ambitious AI agenda. Resolution No. 1941-V provides a comprehensive work plan, a dedicated institutional unit, a commitment to data security through an isolated network and a national legal language model, and attention to the AI literacy of deputies and staff. Law No. O'RQ-1115 adds a first statutory safeguard: AI must not harm fundamental rights, and decisions affecting human rights may not rest solely on AI outputs.

The analysis has shown, however, that the specific constitutional risks of AI in parliaments are not yet addressed by law. Using the concept of algorithmic

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delegation, three gaps were identified: the procedural status of AI outputs, guarantees of algorithmic political neutrality, and the legal independence of parliamentary data and infrastructure. Comparison with the EU AI Act, the Council of Europe Framework Convention, the IPU Guidelines and the practice of the parliaments of Estonia and Brazil suggests that these gaps can be closed with modest, targeted amendments: an advisory and public AI impact analysis of draft laws, intelligent monitoring in oversight with a fixed procedural route and annual algorithmic audit, statutory guarantees of the independence of parliamentary digital infrastructure, and transparency of parliamentary AI use.

The broader lesson extends beyond Uzbekistan. In a legislature, AI is not only a tool of efficiency but an instrument that can redistribute influence among deputies, citizens and the executive. Its regulation therefore belongs not only to information law but also to constitutional law. The guiding principle should be that algorithms may inform deliberation but never replace the deputy's final word, for which the deputy remains answerable to the people.

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